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Reining in Private Agents 
Amitai Etzioni† 
The Constitution and much of statutory law seek to protect 
individual rights from intrusions by the government. It is the 
government’s coercive power that must be constrained. In con-
trast, private agents are assumed by most Americans to engage 
in voluntary transactions, transactions that are mutually bene-
ficial as well as serve the common good.1 Thus, major segments 
of Western political and social philosophy, public disclosure, 
and policymaking hold the private sector to be basically the 
realm of freedom—and the government as the power that needs 
to be checked and reined in. However, this Article presents evi-
dence that at least in three major areas, the said restraints on 
governmental power are circumvented, on a very large scale, by 
private agents carrying out—for the government—activities 
that government is banned from undertaking. These areas con-
cern surveillance, policing, and military interventions overseas. 
The question hence arises: what suggested remedies can correct 
this major challenge to the basic conception that underlies the 
Constitution and the rule of law? After reviewing several reme-
dies, this Article asks whether a more profound reconceptual-
ization is called for. 
This Article begins with a discussion of Americans’ privacy 
rights under the Constitution and current legislation before 
turning to a discussion of the private sector’s largely unregu-
lated collection of personal data and potential remedies to ad-
dress related privacy concerns in Part I. Next, Part II covers 
the widespread use of private police and their lack of accounta-
bility, and then discusses the implications for public safety and 
the effectiveness of proposed reforms. Finally, Part III focuses 
on the U.S. government’s reliance on private military contrac-
tors for overseas missions and the significant problems stem-
ming from their lack of accountability, as well as the implica-
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 1. Moreover, private agents can be limited through civil suits. 
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tions of their use for foreign policy. An overview and discussion 
of remedies follows. 
I.  PRIVACY MERCHANTS   
The right to privacy, like other rights, is first and foremost 
a right “against” the government. It protects Americans from 
undue intrusions by the state.2 The first right to federal privacy 
was formulated in the mid-1960s. This right limited the power 
of the government to interfere in the reproductive choices of 
couples and women (i.e., decisional privacy).3 Several laws have 
further limited the information the government may collect. 
Particularly important among these is the Privacy Act of 1974, 
which restricts government agencies, including the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), Social Security Administration, and 
Medicare, from sharing with third parties the personal infor-
mation they collect on individuals without their consent.4 The 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 requires a warrant or 
court order for police to access a consumer’s video rental rec-
ords, and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 limits dis-
closure of personal information obtained by the state in connec-
tion with motor vehicle records.5 The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act strictly limits phone wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping, except for law enforcement pur-
poses, in which case a warrant or subpoena is required for gov-
ernment access to emails.6 The National Security Act of 1947 
and subsequent legislation following the intelligence scandals 
of the 1970s bans the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
 
 2. True, an oft-cited article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis con-
ceived of privacy as a right to be let alone, mainly from the press; however, 
this was a law review article, not the law of the land. See Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 4. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974). 
 5. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994); Video 
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988). 
 6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in various sections of the United 
States Code, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986)); see also Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ 
ecpa (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (“ECPA does include important provisions 
that protect a person’s wire and electronic communications from being inter-
cepted by another private individual. In general, the statute bars wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping, possession of wiretapping or electronic eaves-
dropping equipment, and the use or disclosure of information unlawfully ob-
tained through wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.”). 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from spying on Americans in 
the United States; what information about them the NSA does 
hold in its computers, it may “read” only once it shows a court 
that it has reason to suspect that the person is the agent of a 
foreign power.7 Finally, the Right to Financial Privacy Act re-
quires a subpoena for the government to access financial rec-
ords from a bank.8 
True, some laws limit the personal information that select 
private parties can collect and share. For example, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) includes 
a Privacy Rule that limits access and sharing of personal medi-
cal information on the part of healthcare-related entities, both 
in the government and private sectors.9 However, by and large, 
Americans have rather limited privacy protections against pri-
vate parties. Corporations may read the emails of employees 
and listen to their phone calls, unless the terms of employment 
commit them to act otherwise. Grounds for libel and defama-
tion are much narrower in the United States than in other na-
tions. 
The Fourth Amendment also provides a major source of 
privacy for individuals against government surveillance. This 
Amendment affirms “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” as well as the requirement of “probable 
cause” for a search warrant to be issued.10 The Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limits how the government 
can collect information for law enforcement purposes, generally 
requiring a warrant for searches and seizures, but making ex-
ceptions for “exigent circumstances,” government “special 
needs” and administrative searches, consent by the person 
searched, “minimally intrusive” searches, and searches in the 
absence of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”11 These priva-
 
 7. Two Sets of Rules for Surveillance, Within U.S. and on Foreign Soil, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ 
two-sets-of-rules-for-surveillance.html?_r=0. 
 8. Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 
MISS. L.J. 139, 162 (2005). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Summary of the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws 
-regulations (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 11. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (on intrusiveness); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (on exigent circumstances); Cali-
fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (on expectations of privacy); New Jer-
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cy protections are enforced in part by the exclusionary rule, 
which limits the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation 
of the privacy doctrine, providing a disincentive for law en-
forcement to do so. After 9/11, the surveillance powers of the 
government were greatly increased; however, these powers be-
came subject to much concern, criticism, and reform, especially 
after the Snowden revelations in 2013, and were amended with 
the 2015 USA Freedom Act.12 
Less attention has been paid to the collection of personal 
information by the private sector. Such collection increased 
over the twenty-first century thanks to advances in information 
technology, and continues to grow rapidly in terms of the quan-
tity, breadth, and dollar value of data collected.13 Broadly 
speaking, there are two kinds of corporations that track the ac-
tivities and backgrounds of Internet users. One category tracks 
user activity on its sites in support of its regular business, such 
as recording purchases and viewed products to help increase 
sales. Though these corporations may sell personal data to ad-
vertisers or others, it is not their primary line of business. A se-
cond category has as its primary business the collection of per-
sonal information, often in the form of detailed dossiers, and 
selling it in the marketplace to any and all comers. Such com-
panies, termed “data brokers” or “privacy merchants,”14 are the 
focus of this section. 
A. PRIVACY MERCHANTS: A MAJOR INDUSTRY 
Privacy merchants, or data brokers, are defined by the 
Federal Trade Commission as “companies that collect infor-
mation, including personal information about consumers, from 
a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such in-
formation to their customers for various purposes, including 
verifying an individual’s identity, differentiating records, mar-
 
sey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (on special needs); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1972) (on consent); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967) (on expectations of privacy and attendant safeguards). 
 12. Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindi-
cation for Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden. 
 13. See, e.g., Gil Press, 6 Predictions For The $125 Billion Big Data Ana-
lytics Market in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
gilpress/2014/12/11/6-predictions-for-the-125-billion-big-data-analytics-market 
-in-2015/#1aafe71a2b20. 
 14. Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is To Be Done?, 14 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 930 (2012). 
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keting products, and preventing financial fraud.”15 As of 2012, 
one leading privacy merchant alone, Acxiom, maintained a da-
tabase of over “500 million active consumers worldwide, with 
about 1,500 data points per person,” including “a majority of 
adults in the United States.”16 Though no comprehensive list of 
privacy merchants exists, estimates of the number of compa-
nies active in this sector ranges from the hundreds to the thou-
sands.17 The industry generated $150 billion in revenue in 
2012,18 compared to $75.4 billion for the U.S. Government’s 
FY2012 Intelligence Budget.19 
Privacy merchants’ collection of consumer information is 
not limited to publicly available information, such as home ad-
dresses and phone numbers. Collection extends to such specific 
and private information as YouTube viewing habits, medical 
conditions, pet ownership, income, social media activity, finan-
cial vulnerabilities, and many other kinds of information.20 
Although privacy merchants’ acts have not elicited the 
same kind of alarm that surveillance by the government has 
engendered, critics express concern about privacy violations 
and call for greater regulation and transparency of these pri-
vate actors. Some note that data brokers create lists of people 
who are victims of sexual assault, or have specific health con-
cerns. These critics argue that “many of the lists have no busi-
ness being in the hands of retailers, bosses or banks” and that 
“[w]e need regulation to help consumers recognize the perils of 
the new information landscape . . . .”21 
 
 15. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE 1, 68 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era 
-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 16. Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2012, at BU1. 
 17. GOV’T. ACCT. OFF., Information Resellers: Consumer Privacy Frame-
work Needs To Reflect Changes in Technology and the Marketplace 1, 5 (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658151.pdf. 
 18. Press Release, Sen. Edward Markey, Markey, Rockefeller Introduce 
Data Broker Bill To Ensure Accuracy, Accountability for Consumers (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-rockefeller 
-introduce-data-broker-bill-to-ensure-accuracy-accountability-for-consumers. 
 19. Intelligence Budget Data, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://fas.org/irp/ 
budget (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 20. S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 113TH 
CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND 
SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES ii (Dec. 18, 2013). 
 21. Frank Pasquale, The Dark Market for Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/opinion/the-dark-market-for 
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The American normative assumptions are that if one is an 
innocent citizen, not suspected of anything, the government 
will know very little about that person. And whatever infor-
mation the government gathers about such people will be 
locked into separate silos, not accessible to other government 
agencies. In contrast, private corporations know a great deal 
about people’s preferences and behaviors, and may (and do) 
keep detailed dossiers on most Americans, although some areas 
are carved out as protected, especially medical information and, 
to a lesser extent, financial data. 
B. PRIVACY MERCHANTS: WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
Very little attention is paid to the fact that the distinction 
between the government and the private sector—which uses in-
formation for commercial purposes to improve customer service 
and make a profit—is increasingly meaningless. Privacy mer-
chants sell the information they amass and process to the gov-
ernment. The difference between the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) assembling detailed dossiers on most Americans 
(which would shock many) versus simply purchasing such a 
dossier from a company such as Acxiom and LexisNexis is in-
creasingly trivial. The private data is but one check and one 
click away from the government. 
The U.S. government in general, and law enforcement 
agencies in particular, have made substantial use of the ser-
vices provided by data privacy merchants since the 1990s.22 
One leading company, ChoicePoint,23 provided “services to 7000 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies” as of 2006.24 
These include “multimillion dollar contracts with at least thir-
ty-five federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and the FBI.”25 Privacy merchants provide services specif-
ically tailored to law enforcement needs, offering to “identify a 
subject’s neighbors, relatives and business associates” and “dis-
cern geographic or pathological patterns in criminal behav-
 
-personal-data.html. 
 22. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your 
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004). 
 23. Choicepoint has since been rebranded “LexisNexis Risk Solutions” af-
ter its acquisition by Reed Elsevier. 
 24. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362 (2006). 
 25. Id. at 363. 
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ior.”26 In 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department began using the 
Work Number database, which is owned by data broker 
Equifax and includes data on “54 million active salary and em-
ployment records, and more than 175 million historical records” 
from “more than 2,500 U.S. employers,” in order to determine 
eligibility for government benefits and reduce fraud.27 Even be-
fore 9/11, “ChoicePoint and similar services ran between four-
teen thousand and forty thousand searches per month for the 
United States Marshals Service alone.”28 
“[C]ommercial data brokers have built massive data cen-
ters with personal information custom-tailored to law enforce-
ment agents,”29 and the FBI now holds “voluminous records 
from commercial data collectors like Acxiom, ChoicePoint,” and 
LexisNexis’s Accurint database.30 Accurint alone claims to be 
used by “over 4,000 federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies across the country” and to have access to “over 34 bil-
lion public and proprietary records.”31 Likewise, findings indi-
cate that “[f]ederal agencies have long evaded the privacy 
standards in the Privacy Act of 1974 by using information from 
commercial databases.”32 
C. PRIVACY MERCHANT ACTIVITIES ARE BASICALLY LEGAL 
There are relatively few limits on personal information 
privacy merchants can collect or disclose compared to those on 
the government. One important limit on disclosure of private 
information is the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) which re-
stricts Consumer Reporting Agencies (CRAs) from disclosing 
information except to third parties who have a “valid need.” 
 
 26. Nicole Duarte, Commercial Data Uses by Law Enforcement Raises 
Questions About Accuracy, Oversight, NEWS21 (Aug. 16, 2006), http://news21 
.com/story/2006/08/16/commercial_data_use_by_law. 
 27. Melanie Hicken, What Information Is the Government Buying About 
You?, CNN MONEY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/30/pf/ 
government-data-broker. 
 28. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008). 
 29. Hoofnagle, supra note 22, at 637. 
 30. Scott Shane, Shifting Mood May End Blank Check for U.S. Security 
Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A1. 
 31. LexisNexis Accurint for Law Enforcement, LEXIS NEXIS (2011), http:// 
www.lexisnexis.com/government/solutions/literature/accurintle_ss.pdf. 
 32. Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Data Brokers and the Federal Govern-
ment: A New Front in the Battle for Privacy Opens, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM 1, 
11 (2013), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ 
WPF_DataBrokersPart3_fs.pdf. 
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These third parties include creditors, landlords, and employ-
ers.33 Employers are required to obtain specific, written consent 
from their employee or job candidate before requesting their 
credit information from a CRA.34 While CRAs may be consid-
ered privacy merchants, they make up only a small fraction of 
that industry; however, other privacy merchants are subject to 
the provisions of the FCRA, to the extent that they provide per-
sonal information used in “making eligibility decisions affecting 
consumers.”35 HIPAA limits direct access to a substantial part 
of health information, though privacy merchants still collect 
data on “over the counter drug purchases; whether the individ-
ual purchased disability insurance; purchase history or interest 
in various health topics like medicine preferences and diabetes 
care; ailment and prescription online searches.”36 The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) requires financial institutions to 
clearly display their privacy policies, and requires them to take 
appropriate measures to “safeguard” private financial infor-
mation from unauthorized disclosure.37 The Act also limits the 
extent to which these institutions can share select types of per-
sonal information with a list of third parties, and gives con-
sumers the right to opt out of having their information shared 
in such cases.38 However, privacy advocates describe GLBA’s 
protections as minimal and note that opt-out provisions put the 
burden of protecting privacy on the consumer.39 No federal law 
gives individuals the right to learn what information privacy 
merchants collect on them. Individuals have no way to opt out 
of having their information collected or analyzed, or take action 
to remove their information from privacy merchants’ records, 
even if that information is inaccurate or outdated.40 Outside of 
 
 33. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1968). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING-
HOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/data-brokers-and 
-people-search-sites (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 36. Erin McCann, FTC Calls Out Health Data Brokers, HEALTHCARE IT 
NEWS (May 28, 2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ftc-calls-out 
-dealth-data-brokers. 
 37. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (1999). 
 38. In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
business-center/guidance/brief-financial-privacy-requirements-gramm-leach 
-bliley-act. 
 39. Financial Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/financial-privacy#3. 
 40. Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 35. 
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the areas covered by statutes such as FCRA, privacy merchants 
are “largely unregulated for privacy” and “generally free to sell 
information as they please with little regard for accuracy, cur-
rency, completeness, or fairness.”41 
Privacy merchants that supply information to the govern-
ment benefit from the Third Party Doctrine. According to this 
doctrine, once a person voluntary releases information to an-
other party—say by purchasing a consumer good online, mak-
ing a deposit in a bank, a phone call—this party can share this 
information with the government. It is no longer private.42 Spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court has held that individuals have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank and telephone 
call records, respectively, setting the precedent that those who 
“voluntarily conveyed” records to third parties “assumed the 
risk” that their confidentiality would be violated.43 Since the 
1970s, developments in communications and information tech-
nology, including the rise of the Internet and the digitization of 
many goods and services, expanded the personal information 
individuals share with third parties. As such, these develop-
ments have increasingly rendered the Third Party Doctrine a 
major gap in Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Because 
“virtually all information obtained through data mining comes 
from third party record holders—either the government itself, 
commercial data brokers, or a commercial entity like a bank—
its acquisition does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”44 
Such a work-around using the Third Party Doctrine “allows the 
government to access information without any federal constitu-
tional restraint.”45 Moreover, “following the attacks of Septem-
ber 11 there has been a dramatic increase in government access 
to third-party information.”46 
Not only does government business with data brokers not 
evoke the Fourth Amendment, but it is largely unregulated by 
statute. Christopher Slobogin, who has focused intensively on 
 
 41. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 10. 
 42. Richard M. Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 
CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 2 (June 5, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43586 
.pdf. 
 43. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 44. Slobogin, supra note 28, at 330. 
 45. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Pro-
tecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 982 (2007). 
 46. Id. 
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the Fourth Amendment, argues that unlike direct physical or 
electronic surveillance by law enforcement, there is far less 
regulation of what has been called “transaction surveillance,” 
the acquisition by the government of already existing records.47 
Even when the government seeks information directly from the 
original third party, federal law on transaction surveillance vir-
tually never requires a warrant.48 Rather, transaction surveil-
lance at most requires a subpoena, typically based on the lax 
standard of “relevance” to an investigation, and in other cases a 
certification order or extrajudicial certification, which Slobogin 
argues are rubber stamps.49 If instead the government obtains 
the same information from a privacy merchant rather than 
from the original third party source, such as a phone company, 
it does not need even a subpoena. As a result, the aforemen-
tioned privacy restrictions can easily be circumvented. For ex-
ample, the Privacy Act has an exception for law enforcement 
(although a written request is still needed to obtain information 
from another government agency), and at any rate does not ap-
ply to records held by the private sector. Even beyond the Pri-
vacy Act’s explicit exceptions, if the government “obtains per-
sonal information from commercial data brokers but keeps the 
information outsourced and does not maintain that information 
in a government system of records,” the Privacy Act “imposes 
few or no privacy constraints on federal agencies, and no con-
straints at all on the commercial data brokers.”50 Likewise, 
while a subpoena is needed for law enforcement to access medi-
cal or financial information covered by HIPAA or FCRA, re-
spectively, the government does not need a subpoena to acquire 
that information from a privacy merchant.51 
In short, the fact that the government can readily circum-
vent whatever limitations are in place on its surveillance of in-
dividuals by purchasing the information from privacy mer-
chants raises the question: has the nation in effect sought to 
abolish privacy, or must the nation find new ways to limit the 
information privacy merchants can amass and above all, what 
they can share with the government? 
 
 47. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 141. 
 48. One exception is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s treat-
ment of communications records stored for fewer than 180 days. Id. at 141. 
 49. Id. at 153. 
 50. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 4–5. 
 51. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 161. 
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D. SUGGESTED REMEDIES 
The following analysis examines four different types of 
possible regulations to remedy privacy concerns arising from 
the activities of privacy merchants. First, regulations requiring 
consent are discussed, followed by an examination of regula-
tions aimed to specifically protect information classified as sen-
sitive. The analysis then turns to regulations limiting what 
private parties may collect, regardless of the sensitivity of the 
data. Finally, regulations that limit the data the government 
can obtain from privacy merchants are discussed. 
1. Require Prior Consent 
A major suggestion to deal with the issue at hand builds on 
the assumption that people own information about themselves 
and hence every secondary use should require the user to gain 
the consent of the “owner.” That is, in effect, the position the 
European Union takes with its Data Protection Directive 
(DPD). DPD asserts that any secondary use of personal infor-
mation released by a person or collected about him or her re-
quires the explicit a priori approval of the original individual 
“owner” of the information, and that granting this consent can-
not be delegated to an agent or machine.52 If such a rule were to 
be fully heeded, research would suffer greatly because of the 
great costs involved in seeking consent and the difficulties of 
securing a representative sample. Security would be hindered 
by having to ask for consent of those one needs to put under 
surveillance. And, given that such information is used many 
times a day, people would have to spend good part of their day 
reviewing requests for consent for such information use. 
The European DPD hence provides a considerable number 
of exceptions to the consent, including for “journalistic purposes 
or for artistic or literary expression.” It also allows national 
laws to add additional exceptions for reasons of national securi-
ty, law enforcement, or “protection of data subjects and the 
rights and freedom of others.”53 Moreover, the DPD is not 
 
 52. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31. 
 53. EUR. COMM’N, Exceptions to Data Protection Rules, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/data-protection/individuals/exceptions/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
14, 2016). 
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strongly or consistently enforced in those areas that are not ex-
empted.54 
2. Protect Sensitive Information 
Sensitive information is defined as personal information 
whose disclosure violates a significant prevailing societal 
norm.55 Much personal information is in effect already ranked 
by law as if the level of sensitivity were being taken into ac-
count. Thus, collecting and reusing medical information in the 
U.S. is highly controlled, as it is considered particularly sensi-
tive (and within that, information on HIV status is even more 
regulated); financial information is somewhat less sensitive—
and less regulated; and non-sensitive information (such as pur-
chases of most consumer goods) is much less regulated. To 
complete this approach, all remaining kinds of personal infor-
mation would have to be regulated according to their level of 
sensitivity. For example, the American Bar Association’s 
Standards Governing Government Access to Third Party Rec-
ords argues that government access to third party information 
should depend on whether the information is “classified as 
highly private, moderately private, minimally private, or not 
private.”56 Another approach would be to regulate government 
access to third party data according to the amount of infor-
mation collected, such as imposing greater restrictions on ob-
taining data about activities over a period of time greater than 
48 hours.57 
Special restrictions have been imposed on secondary use 
and could be extended. For example, HIPAA designates as 
“Protected Health Information” any personally identifiable 
health information that relates to an individual’s medical con-
dition or to their purchase and receipt of healthcare services, 
and mandates that “covered entities” such as doctors, hospitals, 
 
 54. EUR. COMM’N, Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New 
Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments 
1, 15 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_ 
privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf. 
 55. AMITAI ETZIONI, PRIVACY IN A CYBER AGE: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 
(2015). 
 56. AM. BAR ASS’N, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records 
Standards (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/ 
standards/law_enforcement_access.html. 
 57. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones: A 
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 
1, 22 (2012). 
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and insurance companies do not use or disclose such infor-
mation improperly (for example, by selling it to privacy mer-
chants).58 Likewise, the GLBA requires financial institutions to 
maintain the “security and confidentiality” of personal and fi-
nancial information such as “names, addresses, and phone 
numbers; bank and credit card account numbers; income and 
credit histories; and Social Security numbers.”59 However, this 
approach is limited in the era of “Big Data” by the fact that pri-
vacy merchants can often deduce such information through 
analysis of other publicly available information.60 For example, 
retailer Target was able to use predictive analytics to deter-
mine whether its customers were pregnant by analyzing their 
purchases, assigning a “pregnancy prediction” score and accu-
rately estimating the stage of a customer’s pregnancy.61 These 
scores were used for marketing purposes, with those deter-
mined likely to be pregnant sent coupons. However, in at least 
one case, a customer’s privacy was violated when her pregnan-
cy was revealed to her father without her consent through such 
marketing.62 For this approach to work, Congress would have to 
ban using insensitive information to ferret out sensitive infor-
mation.63 
3. Limit the Information Private Parties Can Collect, Whether 
or Not It Is Sensitive 
Several such restrictions are already in place, although 
critics argue that they have not kept pace with advances in 
technology. For example, the FCRA regulates CRAs, which sell 
information about people’s residential and tenant history, em-
ployment history, and insurance claims to entities such as a 
 
 58. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9. 
 59. Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the 
Safeguards Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
business-center/guidance/financial-institutions-customer-information 
-complying. 
 60. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N 1, 14 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade 
-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf. 
 61. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N. Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping 
-habits.html. 
 62. Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, Discrimination 
and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 350–51 (2014–2015). 
 63. See ETZIONI, supra note 55, at 11–12, 32–34. 
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landlords and employees.64 CRAs must provide an accessible 
means for consumers to find out what information the agencies 
have about them and if it has been used against them. Con-
sumers may challenge the accuracy of that information and 
have inaccurate information deleted. Above all, CRAs may only 
sell such information to those with a “valid need.”65 Although 
this rule may deter privacy merchants from selling consumer 
data too broadly, it has little relevance to government purchas-
es of data, as law enforcement officials have long been exempt 
from these protections for counterintelligence and terrorism in-
vestigations, and law enforcement access to credit reports was 
broadened by the Patriot Act.66 
4. Limiting Government Purchasing Power 
A broader shift in privacy law, either by the Supreme 
Court or Congress, should constrain government purchases of 
information from privacy merchants.67 These might include re-
quiring data brokers “to inform Congress whenever they dis-
close information to law enforcement . . . .”68 Another proposed 
solution would be for the Supreme Court to overturn the Katz 
“expectations of privacy” doctrine, or reinterpret it to account 
for society’s “actual” expectations of privacy by removing the 
Third Party Doctrine.69 Joshua L. Simmons argues that the 
“courts should refuse to treat disclosure” to data brokers that 
provide information to the government—which he terms 
“fourth parties”—as “corrosive to an individual’s expectation of 
privacy.” Instead, courts should “apply the same requirements 
to the government in accessing the information from a fourth-
party as they would from a third party.”70 Likewise, he argues 
that “courts must recognize that fourth-parties are agents of 
 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
 65. A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit 
-reporting-act.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 66. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 6. 
 67. Joshua L. Simmons, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-
Parties To Launder Data About “The People,” 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 
982–95. 
 68. Id. at 1000 (citing Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-
Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 902 
(2008)). 
 69. Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in 
Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 89 (2004). 
 70. Simmons, supra note 67, at 1004. 
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the government, and as such, their searches cannot be excused 
by the private party search doctrine.”71 
Another means to accomplish this goal would be for gov-
ernment agencies to restrain themselves from using privacy 
merchants to bypass the constitutional restrictions on their in-
formation collection. For example, the Office of Management 
and Budget’s Do Not Pay Initiative relies on privacy merchants 
to verify eligibility for government benefits and payments. The 
Initiative requires the privacy merchants involved to uphold 
privacy standards including some normally applicable only to 
the government, notably the requirement that any database 
used may not include “records about the exercise of rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”72 However, this very narrow 
example is not representative of government use of privacy 
merchants as a whole,73 and as with “self-regulation” in the pri-
vate sector, this approach has the advantage of being flexible 
and not requiring new legislation, but the disadvantage of lack-
ing an mechanism for outside oversight and enforcement. 
5. Final Thoughts 
In short, there is no lack of suggestions of ways to prevent 
the government from drawing on privacy merchants to circum-
vent constitutional or legislative restrictions on its access to 
personal information. However, these suggestions have not 
been implemented and several of them would exact high costs 
and/or would not protect privacy well. It seems that a profound 
rethinking is called for of the public/private divide and the ma-
jor legal assumptions that it entails. This Article returns to this 
subject after two more “case studies,” dealing with the same 
general subject, are introduced. 
II.  PUBLIC SAFETY AND PRIVATE POLICE   
The number of private police has surpassed that of public 
police, yet private police are not held to the same standards 
and, furthermore, they are accountable to their employers ra-
ther than to the public. The use of private police has dangerous 
implications for public safety and privacy. For example, there is 
often a lack of oversight with regard to the use of firearms by 
private police, a clear public safety concern. And the govern-
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 5. 
 73. Id. at 11. 
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ment has used private police as a way to exploit loopholes in 
the constitutional protections afforded to citizens. 
A. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE POLICE SECTOR? 
Citizens who are otherwise occupied may well assume that 
public safety, keeping people safe in their home and in public 
spaces, is the mission of the police. And one may note, that in 
some cases, they may be backed up by other state-level agen-
cies, such as a State Bureau of Investigation, or—in extreme 
situations—the National Guard. In select cases, the FBI as a 
federal agency also can be activated. Actually, the role of the 
private sector in public safety has grown dramatically over the 
last few decades. The private police sector—those hired, 
trained, armed, and commanded by private parties ranging 
from corporations to neighborhood associations—has grown so 
much in the U.S. that it is now much larger than the public po-
lice. 
Private police in the U.S. include security guards (whether 
employed by security companies or directly by the companies to 
which they provide security), private detectives, and body-
guards. Street policing and prison management,74 while typical-
ly associated with the state, are also contracted out to or sup-
plemented by the private sector.75 
While in the 1970s there were 1.4 private police for every 
public police officer, by the 2000s there were three private po-
lice for every public police officer, and four private police for 
every public police officer in California.76 As for security guards 
in particular, estimates range from 1.5 to 2 of them for every 
public police officer.77 Given that there were “more than 
 
 74. The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that it will phase 
out the use of private prisons. See Charlie Savage, U.S. To Phase Out Use of 
Private Prisons for Federal Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/us-to-phase-out-use-of-private-prisons-for-federal 
-inmates.html?_r=0. 
 75. This essay uses the definition put forward by Elizabeth Joh of this 
“private police” industry as “lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel 
services whose primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection 
of property and life, and the maintenance of order.” See Elizabeth E. Joh, Con-
ceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 577 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 586; see also JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN 
AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY (2003) (chronicling the growth of the 
private police force in the U.S.). 
 77. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1174 
(1999); Shoshana Walter & Ryan Gabrielson, America’s Gun-Toting Guards 
Armed with Poor Training, Little Oversight, REVEAL (Dec. 14, 2014), https:// 
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900,000 sworn law enforcement officers” serving in the U.S. as 
of late 2014, the above ratios would put the number of private 
police in the U.S. at 2.7 million, and the number of security 
guards at 1.35 to 1.8 million (some sources count “1 million 
plus” security guards).78 
In addition to employing more people, the domestic private 
security industry also spends more than public police agen-
cies.79 The most recent major study of the industry put the size 
of the private sector domestic security industry at $282 billion 
(in addition to $69 billion on federal spending, for a total of 
$350 billion).80 This report estimated that there were “between 
1.9 and 2.1 million” full-time security workers in the United 
States as of 2013, and that industry spending is growing rapid-
ly, at 5.5 percent per year in 2013.81 
B. ACCOUNTABILITY 
Private police provide a major way to circumvent the 
standards, oversight, and accountability to which public police 
are subjected. This is not to argue that all or even most private 
police are retained for this purpose. Nor does it mean that the 
public police are subject to sufficient accountability. Much na-
tional attention has recently been paid to abuses by the public 
police, particularly the number of people killed by police, and 
the fact that a highly disproportionate number of those killed 
have been unarmed African Americans.82 However, while ac-




 78. JOHN S. DEMPSEY, INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE SECURITY 66–67 (2010). 
 79. Joh, supra note 75, at 1283. 
 80. Groundbreaking Study Finds U.S. Security Industry To Be $350 Bil-
lion Market, ASIS INT’L (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.asisonline.org/News/ 
Press-Room/Press-Releases/2013/Pages/Groundbreaking-Study-Finds-U.S. 
-Security-Industry-to-be-$350-Billion-Market.aspx. However, that number in-
cluded IT-related spending, which made up 40 percent of the total. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as 
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ly criticized for being insufficient,83 related institutions are at 
least in place and can usher in reforms.84 
At the level of individual police departments, police chiefs 
have spearheaded major reforms of their departments, such as 
William J. Bratton’s reforms of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment during the 1990s.85 In addition, public police departments 
have internal affairs units and are subject to civilian review 
boards such as the Chicago Police Board and the New York Po-
lice Department’s Civilian Complaint Review Board.86 Mayors 
and city councils have also launched police reform, sometimes 
at the urging of grassroots campaigns or NGOs. For example, 
the Community Safety Act in New York City, which curbed ra-
cial profiling, was passed by the New York City Council in 2014 
with the support or endorsement of dozens of local organiza-
tions.87 Independent commissions have also initiated police re-
form, for instance the Christopher Commission, which also es-
tablished an Inspector General position in Los Angeles.88 On 
the state level, state legislatures can promote reforms, as Con-
necticut did in June 2015.89 The judiciary can also impose some 
 
 83. See, e.g., Chase Madar, Why It’s Impossible To Indict a Cop, THE NA-
TION (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-impossible 
-indict-cop. 
 84. Robert C. Davis et al., The Public Accountability of Private Police: Les-
sons from New York, Johannesburg, and Mexico City, 13 POLICING & SOC’Y 
197 (2003). 
 85. Jack Leonard & Richard Winton, Will Bratton’s Reforms Survive After 
His Departure?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/ 
aug/06/local/me-legacy6. 
 86. Martin Kaste, Police Are Learning To Accept Civilian Oversight, But 
Distrust Lingers, NPR (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/21/ 
387770044/police-are-learning-to-accept-civilian-oversight-but-distrust 
-lingers. 
 87. See The Community Safety Act, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE 
REFORM, http://changethenypd.org/community-safety-act (last visited Nov. 14, 
2016). 
 88. Office of the Inspector General, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www 
.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076 (last visited Nov. 
14, 2016); Los Angeles: The Christopher Commission Report, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo73.htm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2016); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, The President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing Implementation Guide: Moving from Recommendations 
to Action (2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Implementation_Guide.pdf; 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Cen-
tury Policing (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_ 
finalreport.pdf. 
 89. Samantha Schoenfeld, Legislature Passes Police Body Cam Law, Mal-
loy’s “Second Chance Society” Legislation, FOX61 (June 29, 2015), http://fox61 
.com/2015/06/29/legislature-passes-police-body-cam-law-malloys-second 
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reforms, for example by ruling that select police policies are un-
constitutional90 or by ordering changes in police practice.91 On 
the federal level, the Justice Department maintains a Civil 
Rights Division that investigates allegations of police civil 
rights abuses and demands reforms.92 In the event that a police 
department displays a pattern of abusive behavior, the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 allows the 
federal government to either formally pursue a federal civil 
rights lawsuit or to pressure the department in question to ac-
cept a “consent decree,” imposing reforms to be overseen by an 
independent monitor and with involvement from community 
stakeholders.93 
Some of these institutions have much less legal authority 
and effective power over private police and others do not apply 
at all. There are no federal training standards for private po-
lice. No state even “comes close to meeting the training stand-
ards recommended by the country’s largest membership group 
for security guards.”94 Many states allow armed private guards 
to carry guns without firearms training, do not require them to 
undergo mental health examinations, do not check if they are 
under court order not to carry weapons, and do not require 
them to report the use of their weapons.95 The same is true for a 
majority of states with regard to “proprietary guards,” those 




 90. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1. 
 91. Jim Salter, Ferguson Municipal Judge Announces Sweeping Changes, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/ 
20150824/us--ferguson-municipal-court. 
 92. Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil Rights Investiga-
tions in Ferguson, Missouri, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS 
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces 
-findings-two-civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri. 
 93. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Joe Domanick, Police Reform’s Best Tool: A Fed-
eral Consent Decree, CRIME REP. (July 15, 2014), http://thecrimereport.org/ 
2014/07/15/2014-07-police-reforms-best-tool-a-federal-consent-decree. 
 94. Walter & Gabrielson, supra note 77; see also Lauren Kirchner, The 
Surprisingly Lax Oversight of the Security Guard Industry, PAC. STANDARD 
(July 1, 2014), https://psmag.com/the-surprisingly-lax-oversight-of-the-security 
-guard-industry-1b3e5f9a7d83#.mcfufvpom. 
 95. Walter & Gabrielson, supra note 77. 
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A 2010 report warned that “leaders in the industry remain 
concerned about the nation’s ability to provide qualified, well-
trained private security officers” and that “proprietary guards 
receive very little oversight and typically follow whatever 
standards are established by their employers.”97 Shooting inci-
dents involving private police are underreported and under-
investigated relative to those involving public police, often with 
no action being taken until an incident makes its way through 
the criminal justice system.98 
Private police are accountable to their employer, not the 
public. Some have warned that “interests of private parties will 
rarely, if ever, be fully aligned with public interests,” and that 
in order to “safeguard justice, equity, and quality of service” 
and the “public interest” as the trend towards private security 
moves forward, “governments must develop the capacity to 
regulate, audit and facilitate the restructuring of policing.”99 
This is because “private police are not subject to the same for-
mal and legal systems of accountability that govern public po-
lice agencies,” including the obligation to inform public authori-
ties of crimes, yet “they may carry weapons, use force, detain 
suspects and intrude on the privacy and rights of individuals.” 
Such a situation of unaccountable policing may become “inher-
ently dangerous to society.”100 Private police are not accountable 
to criminal procedure law and are “disengaged from the moral 
underpinnings of the criminal law,” whereas public police typi-
cally swear to uphold the “public trust.” Furthermore, private 
police “stress preventive means over detection and apprehen-
sion,” and are linked to “private justice systems” that deter and 
punish wrongdoing by “banning, firing, and fining” property of-
fenders such as shoplifters or trespassers.101 
 
 97. Kevin Strom et al., The Private Security Industry: A Review of the Def-
initions, Available Data Sources, and Paths Moving Forward 8-1, RTI INT’L 
(Dec. 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf. 
 98. Shoshana Walter, Shootings by Security Guards Rarely Reported, Let 
Alone Investigated, REVEAL (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.revealnews.org/article/ 
shootings-by-security-guards-rarely-reported-let-alone-investigated. 
 99. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Managing the Boundary Between Public and 
Private Policing, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING 8 (2014), https://www.hks 
.harvard.edu/content/download/67532/1242938/version/1/file/ 
ManagingBoundariesPolicing.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 62–63 (2004). 
  
2016] REINING IN PRIVATE AGENTS 299 
 
Private police are often used, especially in gated communi-
ties, to discriminate against minorities.102 This point has also 
been made about public police and the criminal justice system 
more broadly, due to abuses such as discriminatory sentencing 
and racially-biased “stop-and-frisk” policing.103 However, 
whereas public police are at least supposed to serve the whole 
public, and—to reiterate, the mechanism for accountability and 
reform are at least in place and sometimes used104—critics of 
private policing argue that the industry’s rise represents a 
more explicit move towards a two-tier justice system. At least 
one study, for example, has found that among developed coun-
tries, reliance on private security correlates with the Gini coef-
ficient, a measure of inequality, with the U.S. high and increas-
ing on both counts.105 Likewise, other analyses of demographic 
and policing data show that “racial threat and economic ine-
quality” better explain the prevalence of private police locally 
than the serious crime rate.106 
 
 102. See, e.g., Angel M. Traub, The Wall Is Down, Now We Build More: The 
Exclusionary Effects of Gated Communities Demand Stricter Burdens Under 
the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379 (2000); Richard Damstra, Don’t Fence 
Us Out: The Municipal Power To Ban Gated Communities and the Federal 
Takings Clause, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 525 (2001); CLIFFORD D. SHEARING & 
PHILLIP C. STENNING, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE CHAL-
LENGE OF THE 80S: A REVIEW OF THE POLICY ISSUES 9 (1982). 
 103. See, e.g., Editorial, Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2013, at A22. 
 104. While the Supreme Court did rule in DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services that the government, including public police, 
does not have a “constitutional duty” to protect private individuals from each 
other, this stems more from the understanding of Constitution as restricting 
rather than requiring government action: “the Due Process Clause . . . forbids 
the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due 
process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative ob-
ligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm 
through other means.” 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). By contrast, public police do 
commit to actively protect the public. For example, the NYPD mission state-
ment promises “to enhance the quality of life in New York City by working in 
partnership with the community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce 
fear, and maintain order.” Mission, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 105. Samuel Bowles & Arjun Jayadev, One Nation Under Guard, N.Y. 
TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 15, 2014), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/15/one-nation-under-guard. 
 106. Stewart J. D’Alessio et al., The Impact of Serious Crime, Racial 
Threat, and Economic Inequality on Private Police Size, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 
2267, 2267–82 (2005); see also Rick Ruddell, Matthew O. Thomas, & Ryan 
Patten, Examining the Roles of the Police and Private Security Officers in Ur-
ban Social Control, 13 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 54, 65 (2011) (“The idea 
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Another issue raised by private policing is the fact that it 
can be difficult for members of the public to distinguish private 
from public police. In some cases, off-duty police officers moon-
lighting as private police “wear[] their public uniforms and 
driv[e] their regular squad cars,”107 wrongly giving the appear-
ance that they are “on duty and available to assist the general 
public.”108 At the same time, purely private police often “dress 
and act like public law enforcement” and thus wrongly “imply 
that they are acting with state authority” within the public 
monopoly on “state-sanctioned use of force and coercion.”109 Po-
lice companies issue uniforms that are “often indistinguishable 
from public police uniforms,” with the result that “private secu-
rity personnel are frequently mistaken for public police.”110 For 
example, one prominent private police force in San Francisco, 
the patrol special police, “wear uniforms cut in a different 
shade of blue with seven-pointed stars instead of six.”111 Special 
Conservators of the Peace, individually designated private po-
lice in Virginia, are permitted by law to refer to themselves as 
“police” and, “upon request and for good cause shown,” use 
flashing lights on their vehicles.112 Statewide Patrol, a Texas-
based private police firm, uses this ambiguity as a selling point 
for its services, boasting: “Statewide Patrol’s standing guards 
project authority, professionalism, and confidence. The look of 
our uniform closely resembles those of law enforcement[,] in-
cluding a metal badge, brass nametag, shoulder patches, and 
appropriate rank.”113 
Private police are usually not subject to constitutional lim-
its. The criminal procedure law that restrains public police con-
sists of a “vast set of interrelated constitutional doctrines,” in-
cluding “the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, made 
 
of security as a general public good, and not simply an additional resource for 
those with economic advantage, should lead to a discussion about the roles of 
private security and the police.”). 
 107. Joh, supra note 101, at 64. 
 108. Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 MO. L. REV. 
177, 185 (2005). 
 109. Id. at 186, 204. 
 110. Id. at 204. 
 111. Rachel Swan, The Right To Remain Special: The City’s Other Police 
Force Struggles Against Extinction, S.F. WEEKLY (Sept. 18, 2013), http:// 
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 112. See Va. Code § 19.2-13 (2016). 
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applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, along with the Supreme Court’s elab-
orate efforts to implement those provisions through rules of ev-
identiary exclusion and the restrictions on interrogations im-
posed by Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny.”114 Private police, 
like other private citizens, are restrained merely by “tort and 
criminal doctrines of assault, trespass, and false imprison-
ment.”115 This means in practice that “confessions extracted by 
private police without Miranda warnings and evidence ob-
tained through unlawful searches conducted by private agents 
are not subject to exclusionary rules.”116 Thus, a move towards 
greater reliance on private police threatens to undermine the 
civil liberties gained over the twentieth century with respect to 
public police—as limited as these gains may be.117 
One explanation for the increasing prevalence of private 
police in the U.S. is the emergence of “mass private property,” 
such as housing complexes, shopping malls, and university 
campuses, with the consequence that “more and more public 
life now takes place on property which is privately owned.”118 As 
agents of property owners, private police on private property 
may have authority that public police lack, such as the “powers 
of exclusion or ejection for those considered undesirable or un-
welcome from the malls, corporate campuses, and other private 
spaces that are policed privately.”119 In other words, the en-
forcement power of private police in large part relates to exclu-
sion of people from private property, which the Supreme Court 
views as “central to the private property right.”120 In this capac-
ity, private police may “complete limited, investigative stops of 
individuals on private property” to the extent permitted by 
state law, and officers may conduct “routine searches” of any 
employee’s “person or property” if required by that employee’s 
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contract.121 At the same time, when investigating theft, employ-
ee wrongdoing, or other matters, private police “commonly 
question suspects, interview witnesses, and prepare reports for 
litigation,” without the obligation to issue Miranda warnings 
and, “regardless of the context of the private police interroga-
tion,” with “any incriminating information obtained” being 
“normally admissible in future criminal prosecutions.”122 At the 
same time, rather than opt to prosecute, private police may in-
stead impose private sanctions such as firing an employee.123 
There are some exceptions to the immunity of private po-
lice from constitutional limits. Section 1983 of the U.S. Code 
provides an “action at law” against “every person” who, acting 
“under color of” state law, violates a plaintiff ’s federal constitu-
tional or statutory rights.124 Individuals claiming to have been 
“detained, harassed, physically abused, or otherwise injured by 
private police” may bring a § 1983 action “when the private po-
lice act under color of law, for example by acting jointly with lo-
cal police, by exercising police powers granted by statute or by 
the local police, and when private security is provided by off-
duty police in their official uniforms.”125 
The Supreme Court has “shied away from addressing the 
constitutional status of private police” while developing “an 
elaborate, notoriously muddled doctrine of state action” with 
unclear relevance to private police,126 and the Court has not 
provided meaningful guidance to lower courts on the constitu-
tional status of private police.127 Moreover, public police benefit 
from “having a private arm that reports crimes, that may de-
tain and search citizens, and that may even testify in court, 
admitting evidence that might otherwise be excluded.”128 
Since the 1970s, public police have increasingly relied on 
private security personnel “to obtain evidence that effectively 
circumvent[s] constitutional requirements under the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,” which is a legal loophole “so 
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long as a court can find that there was a ‘legitimate private 
purpose behind the search.’”129 This practice has been referred 
to as the “silver platter doctrine”; it suggests that current law 
and “new organizational forms of partnership create incentives 
that permit the circumvention of rules meant to constrain pub-
lic police behavior.”130 Finally, it may be that “the greater the 
legal constraints on the public police, the more private police 
will be turned to for ‘dirty work,’ sometimes by the public police 
themselves.”131 
In short, public police conduct in a considerable number of 
cities is subject to criticism and concern. However, there are at 
least basic mechanisms in place for oversight, accountability, 
and reform. The private police, which often do not operate in 
high-crime areas and hence have less opportunity to commit 
abuse, are not subject to the same procedural checks as public 
police and may be available to carry out the public police’s 
“dirty businesses.” 
C. WHAT REMEDIES? 
Various suggestions have been made as to how to remedy 
issues stemming from the extensive use of private police. The 
remedies next discussed include restricting the extent to which 
police privatization occurs, increasing control mechanisms over 
private police, and bringing private police under the umbrella 
of constitutional restrictions that currently are applied to pub-
lic police. 
1. Privatization of the Police Could Be Stopped or Rolled Back 
While it is worth analyzing how privatization can be better 
managed, the U.S. should “rethink how much policing we want 
to privatize at all.”132 “[B]ringing public values to private polic-
ing” by holding private police to the same regulatory and con-
stitutional standards as public police is possible but impracti-
cal, because private entities use private police largely because 
they are exempt from meeting the same standards as public po-
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lice.133 Thus, little reform has taken place over the decades of 
police privatization, “meaningful constitutional protections 
against underpolicing do not exist,” and “there is virtually no 
political support” for stricter regulation or labor standards for 
private police.134 There is likewise scant political support for 
ending private police work. 
2. More Control of the Private Police 
The shift towards private policing could make law en-
forcement “less egalitarian” but could be managed in part if 
“privatization chiefly took the form of government outsourcing, 
so that decisions about the allocation of law enforcement re-
sources remained in the public sphere.”135 Another solution 
would require developing constitutional protections against the 
unfair or unequal distribution of police resources, although to 
date the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea of “min-
imally adequate protection” holding that “[d]ue process limits 
government’s ‘power to act’” rather than “‘guarantee[ing] min-
imal levels of safety and security.’”136 Along similar lines, some 
have advocated that public police should accept the need to 
work with private police, but must “do their utmost to make 
sure that overall provision of security squares with their public 
purpose,” and “tak[e] responsibility for the distribution of pro-
tection across society.”137 
Moreover, “judicial attempts to control private police be-
havior through the expansion of the state action doctrine would 
be ineffective at deterring private police misconduct.”138 In-
stead, some have called for a legislative, regulatory approach 
that would “mandate private police transparency, afford ag-
grieved parties with an efficient means of redress, and ensure 
public accountability.”139 Likewise, “[t]he enormous and largely 
unregulated private police industry in this country has flour-
ished” in part due to government “disengagement by failure to 
regulate,” and thus that private policing “deserves much more 
attention as an institution not wholly private, but public as 
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well.”140 However, “imposition of increased control of private po-
lice behavior, if borrowing from criminal procedure law, must 
incorporate the understanding” of the significant differences 
between the two sectors.141 In this sense, Elizabeth Joh and Da-
vid Sklansky, two prominent scholars on criminal law, agree 
that the private and public police are fundamentally different, 
but Joh takes a more positive view of the opportunities this dif-
ference presents. 
3. Constitutional Restrictions on the Public Police Could Be 
Expanded to Cover Private Police 
This approach is favored by some, who argue that re-
strictions stemming from the Bill of Rights “should follow func-
tion over form: both official police and private police function-
ing as arms of the state should be held to constitutional 
standards because they have been legitimized, directly or indi-
rectly, by the state, to fulfill a public demand for order and se-
curity.”142 However, the same approach may not be appropriate 
for “private mercenaries who fulfill merely a private demand 
for force unrelated to communal order and security.”143 Yet, at-
tempts by courts to address the issues raised by private police 
are “vanishingly rare.”144 
4. Final Thoughts 
Scholars have suggested various ways to subject private 
police to the same oversight and accountability as public police, 
the lack of which is often used in effect to circumvent the con-
stitutional restrictions imposed on the public police. However, 
these suggestions have not been implemented and several of 
them would exact high costs and/or would not protect the public 
well. It is hence necessary to profoundly rethink the pub-
lic/private divide and the major legal assumptions that it en-
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tails. The Article returns to this subject after one more “case 
study,” dealing with the same general subject, is introduced. 
III.  PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS   
Just as many expect “the police” (meaning the public po-
lice) to ensure public safety at home, many expect that the mili-
tary to be responsible for defending the nation against external 
threats. Thus, the state is often defined in terms of its “mo-
nopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given ter-
ritory.”145 Many view this definition of the state as “common 
sense” and the “obvious starting point in most investigations” of 
security and violence.146 Those who study globalization and non-
state actors “generally assume that coercive power still resides 
with the state,”147 and modern development theory views secu-
rity as a “constitutive”148 state function. 
In reality, the private sector conducts much of the business 
of U.S. national defense, including the production of military 
assets and services and the training of personnel. Of $519 bil-
lion in federal spending on contracts in 2012,149 the Defense 
Department accounted for 70 percent, allocating 56 percent of 
its own budget on contracts. Both percentages increased over 
the last decade, although federal spending on contracts fell 
slightly to $445 billion in 2014.150 The top ten contractors work-
ing for the government in 2014 were defense contractors or sig-
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nificantly involved in defense.151 Private contractors provide ve-
hicles, armor, weapons, transportation, logistical support, and 
many other goods and services; make up about a quarter of in-
telligence workers; and absorb “70 percent or more of the intel-
ligence community’s secret budget.”152 As with private police, 
defense contractors in addition often play a complementary role 
to the public military, with roles including protecting diplo-
mats,153 providing counterterrorism training, and supplement-
ing U.S. military forces abroad.154 This Part focuses on private 
actors that carry out military missions overseas, referred to 
from here on as “private military contractors” (PMCs). 
A. THE RISE OF MILITARY CONTRACTING 
The PMC sector is large and growing both in the U.S. and 
internationally. Since the 1990s, the PMC industry “has be-
come global in both its scope and activity,” while at the same 
time it has showed “unprecedented” levels of outsourcing.155 
This outsourcing of U.S. military services is exemplified by the 
U.S. military’s increasing use of PMCs for “an array of services: 
security, military advice, training, logistics support, policing, 
technological expertise, and intelligence.”156 While “true global 
statistics on private security contractor use do[] not currently 
exist,” a comparison of two U.S. military actions gives a sense 
of the expansion of PMC activity in recent decades.157 Whereas 
in the first Gulf War, the U.S. military hired 9200 contractors, 
with a troop-to-contractor ratio of 55:1, the 2003 Iraq War wit-
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nessed U.S. employment of 190,000 contractors by 2011, with a 
troop-to-contractor ratio of less than 1:1.158 
The military has increasingly depended on contractors and 
has relied on them to perform a wider array of functions.159 
Contracting is theoretically limited by the requirement that 
contractors not perform “inherently governmental functions,” 
but the Office of Management and Budget defines these in a 
circular fashion as “a function so intimately related to the pub-
lic interest as to require performance by Federal Government 
employees,”160 leaving much room for interpretation. The Fed-
eral Activities Inventory Reform Act expands this definition, 
including functions such as policy determination, “military or 
diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings,” func-
tions “significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property inter-
ests of private persons,” and the management of U.S. govern-
ment employees, funds, or property.161 
PMCs (also referred to as “PMFs”, or “Privatized Military 
Firms”) can be defined as “private business entities that deliver 
to consumers a wide spectrum of military and security ser-
vices,” including “combat operations, strategic planning, intelli-
gence, risk assessment, operational support, training, and 
technical skills” that were “once generally assumed” to be pub-
lic in nature.162 
The following discussion focuses on the ways PMCs are 
used to circumvent rules that limit the use of the military. Be-
fore proceeding two comments are called for. First, to suggest 
that PMCs need more controls is not to suggest that the mili-
tary always conducts itself in an exemplary fashion. However, 
as shown in regard to public and private police, in the case of 
the military the mechanisms for accountability and reform are 
least in place, and often have worked. This is much less the 
case for PMCs. Second, the CIA and NSA, whose work as clan-
destine agencies does not adhere to the same code of conduct 
and accountability as the military, raise a whole slew of issues 
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similar to those raised by PMCs, but these lie outside the scope 
of the following examination.163 
B. PROBLEMS WITH U.S. USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
CONTRACTORS 
Concerns regarding the use of private military contractors 
by the United States fall into two categories. First, PMCs gen-
erally lack accountability. The contractors have more direct au-
thority over their employees than the U.S. military does. 
Hence, the U.S. found itself in a situation where it lacked effec-
tive management practices. Second, the measures that do exist 
for holding PMCs accountable have lacked consistent and effec-
tive application. The result has been serious human rights 
abuses committed by PMCs that often go unpunished. 
1. Private Military Contractors Are Not Held Accountable for 
Abuses 
The last decade’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq witnessed 
extensive corruption and serious human rights abuses by 
PMCs. While uniformed military personnel were sometimes 
held accountable by military courts, PMCs and other contrac-
tors were rarely held responsible for wrongdoing.164 According 
to the bipartisan Congressional Commission on Wartime Con-
tracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC), which issued a series 
of detailed reports between 2008 and 2011, the “limited juris-
diction over criminal behavior and limited access to records” 
that characterized the PMC sector contributed “to an environ-
ment where contractors misbehave with limited accountabil-
ity.”165 Of the more than $206 billion spent by the U.S. on con-
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tracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2011, be-
tween $31 billion and $60 billion was lost to waste and abuse.166 
Although some PMCs have been convicted of fraud or bribery,167 
accountability has been generally lacking.168 While the details 
of this wartime fraud and abuse are covered extensively else-
where,169 it is worth briefly noting some of the abuses commit-
ted by PMCs in particular to demonstrate the relevance of their 
ambiguous legal status. 
Perhaps the most notorious example of abuse of the 2003 
Iraq War concerned the Abu Ghraib prison. Amnesty Interna-
tional and media organizations reported that U.S. personnel, 
including soldiers and PMCs, had engaged in “systematic 
abuse” of prisoners. This included torture, sexual abuse, and 
interrogation-related deaths.170 These abuses were largely un-
punished; eleven U.S. soldiers were convicted of crimes relating 
to the scandal, but these were “were mostly low-ranking sol-
diers and they generally received lenient sentences.”171 The 
PMCs involved in the scandal have evaded even this limited 
level of accountability, in part because the Justice Department 
has abstained from prosecution.172 A class-action suit by former 
Abu Ghraib prisoners against one of the contractors involved, 
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CACI International, is still ongoing as of 2016, after a series of 
contradictory court rulings over the justiciability of the case. In 
the most recent ruling, a district court again dismissed the de-
tainees’ claims, on the basis of the “political question” doctrine, 
which holds that “courts are not authorized or equipped to re-
solve certain matters—like some military decisions or aspects 
of foreign relations—and must leave them to the other branch-
es of government.”173 In other words, PMCs working in Abu 
Ghraib, who “were involved in many of the very same inci-
dents,”174 were too close to the military to be prosecuted by U.S. 
courts, yet not close enough to be subject to the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.175 
A host of smaller incidents of abuse have gone unpunished. 
In 2006, for example, contractors working for Triple Canopy 
fired on Iraqi civilians “for sport” but were not prosecuted.176 A 
2010 study on the role of contractors in the Iraq war found not-
ed that “[r]eports are plentiful of [PSCs] committing serious, 
sometimes fatal, abuses of power in Iraq,” including “armed 
contractors taking offensive measures” or behaving “in an un-
necessarily threatening, arrogant, or belligerent way,” resulting 
in State Department personnel having to “manage the conse-
quences.”177 Over one-fifth of State Department personnel re-
ported “sometimes” or “often” having “•rsthand knowledge of 
armed contractors mistreating Iraqi civilians.”178 Local observ-
ers reported that aggression towards civilians was simply part 
of PMC’s rules of engagement: “each time they went out they 
had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of the road, being 
overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off 
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the road, making enemies each time.”179 While the most egre-
gious incident of abuse by PMCs, the 2007 Nisour Square kill-
ings of fourteen Iraqis, did result in a federal judge giving long 
jail sentences to four security contractors involved,180 this was a 
rare exception to the prevailing lack of accountability.181 
Incidents of this nature are not merely of great concern 
from an ethical viewpoint; they also undermine U.S. military 
operations. In Iraq, the public perception that contractors oper-
ated with impunity led to growing hostility not only towards 
contractors, but also towards the U.S. military.182 Public opin-
ion in Afghanistan and Iraq was especially inflamed when con-
tractors were accused of serious crimes but escaped justice due 
to the fact that “jurisdiction over contractors is ambiguous, le-
gal accountability is uncertain, and a clear command-and-
control structure is absent,” leading to “intense enmity.”183 Po-
litical scientists working for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research found “strong evidence that local exposure to civilian 
casualties caused by international forces” in Afghanistan led to 
“increased insurgent violence over the long-run,” while a sepa-
rate study suggested that civilian casualties in Iraq made civil-
ians less willing to share information with U.S. and allied forc-
es.184 
Although PMCs may be bound by contractual arrange-
ments with a customer, such as the U.S. government, military 
officers have no direct control “over a private military contrac-
tor” and lack “even the legal authority to order a contractor to 
do those services he or she was hired to perform,” with the “du-
ty of disciplining contractors” instead falling “squarely on the 
contractors’ corporate employer.”185 In such a situation, military 
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officers must rely on “soft control,” “persuasion and horse trad-
ing” to keep contractors in line.186 According to the Congres-
sional Budget Office, “[t]he military commander has less direct 
authority over the actions of contractor employees than over 
military or government civilian subordinates” and “limited au-
thority for taking disciplinary action,” as “[t]he contractor, not 
the commander, is responsible for ensuring that employees 
comply with laws, regulations, and military orders.”187 
Second, the government’s reliance on contractors in over-
seas military operations far exceeded its capacity to manage 
these contractors. The most detailed study on this issue, the fi-
nal report of the CWC, points to numerous flaws in the con-
tracting process, including the failure of the Defense and State 
Departments and USAID to reform their structures, practices, 
and cultures in preparation for a heavy reliance on contrac-
tors.188 As a result, according to the CWC, the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan were characterized by an “unhealthy over-
reliance” on contractors, including contracting of “functions 
that law or regulation require government employees to per-
form”; worsening of “risks to mission or other key U.S. objec-
tives”; undermining of “federal agencies’ ability to self-perform 
core capabilities”; and a decline in the “government’s ability to 
effectively manage and oversee contractors.”189 
Third, this heavy reliance on contractors has troubling im-
plications for democratic and constitutional constraints on the 
conduct of foreign policy. Similar to comments made with re-
spect to private police,190 PMC’s lack of accountability provides 
a perverse incentive for future administrations to contract out 
“dirty work” such as torture. Use of PMCs can disrupt the bal-
ance of powers within the government. For example, “[b]ecause 
Congress has less information about and control over the use of 
contractors than the use of troops,” using PMCs can “speed pol-
icy making and limit the number and variety of inputs into the 
 
ity After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237, 1242 (2005). 
 186. Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors Under Military Law, 37 PA-
RAMETERS 83, 89 (2007). 
 187. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS 
IN IRAQ 20 (2008). 
 188. See generally COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN, supra note 183, at 2 (providing recommendations in an effort to 
rein in the excessive costs and abuses presented by private contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan). 
 189. Id. at 19. 
 190. ERICSON, supra note 131, at 179. 
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policy process” and so bypass “some of the constitutionalism 
said to be key to democratic policy making.”191 Use of PMCs also 
“has the potential to reduce the political costs of using force—
not because most people care less about private soldiers’ 
deaths, but because people know less about them.”192 In other 
words, PMCs allow the government to “circumvent or evade 
public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role 
as global policeman.”193 
For example, as the security situation in Iraq and Afghani-
stan has remained volatile following U.S. troop drawdowns in 
those countries, the U.S. has relied on contractors to bridge the 
gap between public statements about only limited troop in-
creases and the actual needs for larger troop increases.194 As of 
2015, in Afghanistan, there were 39,600 contractors supporting 
the U.S. training and advising mission, including 14,200 U.S. 
citizen contractors, compared to 10,000 U.S. troops. While the 
number of U.S. contractors in Iraq fell dramatically after troop 
withdrawal from that country, the Defense Department began 
in March 2015 to seek additional PMCs to support the U.S. ef-
fort against ISIS.195 Such deployments allow the U.S. to claim 
that it is adhering to a “no boots on the ground” policy despite 
placing a considerable number of boots on said ground. This is 
an instance of a broader phenomenon of “awarding contracts to 
provide services” that make the federal workforce “appear 
smaller,” which the Commission on Wartime Contracting refers 
to as the “shadow workforce.”196 
 
 191. Deborah Avant & Lee Sigelman, What Does Private Security in Iraq 
Mean for US Democracy at Home? 38 (Jan. 24, 2008) (presented at the Burkle 
Center, UCLA), https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Avant_08.pdf. 
 192. Id. 
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gy, INT’L PEACE RES. INST. 5 (Jan. 2009), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ 
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for Iraq, STARS AND STRIPES (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/in-place 
-of-boots-on-the-ground-us-seeks-contractors-for-iraq-1.301798 (quoting Alli-
son Stanger: “In the era of contractors wars, there are many ways to avoid 
putting boots on the ground, while committing significant U.S. resources and 
actually being very much militarily involved,” and Michael O’Hanlon: “As the 
political premium seems always to be placed on how many troops we have 
abroad, the pressure to have contractors do as much as possible only grows 
. . . .”). 
 195. Paul McLeary, US Looking for Contractors To Help in Iraq, DEF. 
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/03/09/us 
-private-contractor-iraq-isis/24654439. 
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2. Legal Accountability Is Fragmentary and Ineffective 
While some accountability measures do exist for PMCs 
working overseas on behalf of the U.S. government, they have 
not been applied consistently or effectively. PMCs may be pros-
ecuted under U.S. law, the domestic laws of another party to 
the conflict, or international law. U.S. civilian courts have been 
the most effective means of prosecuting abuses committed by 
security contractors abroad. For example, the Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)197 allows federal prosecution 
of contractors who are U.S. nationals who commit federal 
crimes abroad while working directly for the Department of De-
fense or an agency “supporting the mission of the Department 
of Defense.”198 At least 12 contractors were charged under 
MEJA between its passage in 2000 and 2008, in addition to 
three contractors indicted for kidnapping in Iraq in 2008, and 
the six Blackwater contractors charged for the 2007 Nisour 
Square incident in Iraq.199 U.S. “special maritime and territori-
al jurisdiction,” on the other hand, limits federal prosecution 
for crimes committed within “any facilities run by the U.S. 
overseas.”200 
PMCs may also be prosecuted under military law. The Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) places security contrac-
tors “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field” 
under the jurisdiction of military courts during a “time of de-
clared war” or “contingency operations.”201 Although at least one 
Canadian-Iraqi contractor has been prosecuted for assault un-
der this provision, this amendment would likely face a serious 
constitutional challenge in the event of a court martial of a U.S. 
civilian.202 The Supreme Court has historically prohibited mili-
tary trials of civilians without a declaration of war.203 The mili-
tary currently views the UCMJ as an option of last resort for 
 
note 183, at 27. 
 197. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 212 (2006). 
 198. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2006). 
 199. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40991, PRIVATE SECU-
RITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LEGAL ISSUES 23 (2010). 
 200. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 50. 
 201. Id. at 51; see also 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006) (“The following persons 
are subject to this chapter . . . . In time of declared war or a contingency opera-
tion, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.”). 
 202. ELSEA, supra note 199, 25–28. 
 203. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 50. 
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prosecuting contractors, and prefers to defer to the Department 
of Justice.204 
Prosecution by U.S. courts offers the best option to hold 
contractors accountable for abuses committed overseas. How-
ever, large gaps remain in the effectiveness of this option. For 
its part, MEJA does not apply to contractors whose work is un-
related to a Defense Department mission, a “significant loop-
hole” according to an Assistant Attorney General,205 and only 
applies to crimes for which the sentence is a year or more. 
Moreover, prosecution at a long distance from the site of the al-
leged abuses has severe disadvantages in and of itself. There is 
the expense and “difficulty in gathering evidence from distant 
locations days, or even weeks, after the event,” the even more 
difficult task of getting foreign witnesses to testify in the U.S., 
and the “language barriers and severe safety concerns” for civil-
ian investigators.206 Moreover, both these difficulties and the 
dependence on PMCs contribute to a “lack of prosecutorial mo-
tivation” to conduct MEJA-related investigations.207 The Justice 
Department acknowledges that there are “significant limits to 
[their] ability to prosecute” because any case must focus not on-
ly “on the underlying criminal conduct, but also on the scope of 
the defendant’s employment, his or her specific work duties, 
and other jurisdiction-related facts.”208 Thus, the “legal frame-
work for domestic criminal prosecution” of PMC abuses exists 
but “does not work” because “neither civilian nor military pros-
ecutors have thus far done much to enforce these statutes.”209 
Given the limits of the above measures for ensuring ac-
countability for PMCs, a Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 
 204. ELSEA, supra note 199, at 28. 
 205. Peter T. Nguyen, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: Past 
Legacy and Future Challenges, LAW STUDENT CONNECTION (Aug. 14, 2013), 
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 206. Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contrac-
tors’ Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1065–
66 (2010); SCAHILL, supra note 169, at 27–29; see also Marc Lindemann, Civil-
ian Contractors Under Military Law, 27 U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q. PARAMETERS 
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 207. See Chapman, supra note 206, at 1065. 
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2016] REINING IN PRIVATE AGENTS 317 
 
Act (CEJA)210 has been repeatedly put forward in Congress that 
would “extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction over federal govern-
ment contractors and employees fielded abroad for serious 
crimes committed while employed by any U.S. department or 
agency other than the Department of Defense without impact-
ing the conduct of U.S. intelligence agencies abroad.”211 Howev-
er, previous incarnations212 of this bill have made little pro-
gress.213 CEJA has been introduced to Congress seven times 
since 2010, but has yet to become law. Opponents have argued 
that CEJA would impair U.S. intelligence agencies, as it only 
exempts intelligence activity “consistent with applicable U.S. 
law,” a difficult requirement for intelligence agents to satisfy,214 
raising the prospect that intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies would have to “pay for defense attorneys and risk jail 
time at the political whim of the Justice Department.”215 A se-
cond option for prosecuting abuses by PMC abroad is through 
the domestic criminal justice system of the countries in ques-
tion. In the two major recent conflicts in which the U.S. relied 
heavily on PMC, Iraq and Afghanistan, many contractors ob-
tained immunity from local law through treaty arrangements, 
largely negating this option.216 Before and following those 
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agreements, there were a few domestic Iraqi and Afghan prose-
cutions of contractors involved in abuse. For example, Afghan 
courts sentenced Bill Shaw, a British contractor who provided 
security to the UK embassy in Kabul, to jail for two years for 
bribery,217 and Robert Langdon, an Australian contractor in Af-
ghanistan, received a death sentence (later reduced to a twen-
ty-year jail sentence) for murder.218 An Iraqi court likewise sen-
tenced a British contractor, Danny Fitzsimons, to a twenty-
year prison sentence for murder.219 However, this option is af-
fected by the fact that many such cases take place in the con-
text of an ongoing military occupation or other security rela-
tionships, as was illustrated by the case of the 2009 murder of 
contractor James Kitterman in Iraq. Five fellow contractors 
were arrested during a joint investigation of the murder by 
U.S. and Iraqi forces,220 but were later released due to lack of 
evidence against them, after which legal analysts disagreed on 
whether the U.S. had violated their due process in cooperating 
with the Iraqi investigation.221 During this period, two of the 
contractors were transferred to a U.S. base, but remained tech-
nically under Iraqi custody, while U.S. and Iraqi officials “of-
fered a series of contradictory and inaccurate statements” as 
they tried to make sense of the jurisdictional issues following 
the end of contractor immunity under the previous status of 
forces agreement.222 Another drawback of relying on host coun-
 
official U.S. withdrawal in 2014, a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) man-
dated that contractors will be subject to Afghan criminal and civil jurisdiction. 
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try prosecution is that PMC firms often “operate in institution-
ally weak areas” such as failed states;223 Iraq and Afghanistan, 
for example, are both notorious for flawed and abusive criminal 
justice systems.224 Moreover, as international organizations, 
PMC firms can “move across borders or transform themselves,” 
unlike a national military.225 
Gaps in U.S. and local law often allow PMCs to escape ac-
countability for abuses they have committed. Few contractors 
have been prosecuted for abuses, despite “numerous incidents 
of reported abuse,”226 and contractors are held accountable 
much less often than the uniformed military.227 Peter Warren 
Singer, one of the nation’s leading scholars on defense, sees the 
possibility of legal recourse against security contractor firms as 
very slim, for while state militaries have all manner of tradi-
tional controls such as domestic and international laws, public 
opinion, and internal checks and balances, accountability for 
security contractors is diffused and difficult to track, making it 
difficult to determine who to hold responsible for illegal ac-
tions.228 
Finally, PMCs may be prosecuted under international law, 
such as through an international war crimes tribunal, although 
this option has been basically theoretical to date. International 
humanitarian law focuses on conflicts between states, but does 
criminalize some human rights violations by non-state actors, 
including murder, torture, and degrading treatment.229 Addi-
tional Protocol II, which strengthens civilian protections for 
non-international armed conflicts, also applies to “organized 
armed groups.” (The U.S. has not ratified this protocol.)230 The 
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Genocide Convention and the International Criminal Court’s 
Rome Statute also apply to non-state actors, and although the 
U.S. has not signed this statute, a country that has could sub-
mit war crimes by PMCs for prosecution.231 International hu-
manitarian law applies to individuals, but whether it can be 
used to prosecute a corporation (such as a PMC firm) is a mat-
ter of debate.232 International human rights law largely applies 
to PMC only to the extent they act as agents of a state. For ex-
ample, the Convention Against Torture requires some involve-
ment by “a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”233 Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is understood to protect against government 
abuses, although this may include non-state actors affiliated 
with a government.234 
International law has struggled to gain traction in U.S. 
courts. The State Action Doctrine, according to which private 
actors “cannot be held to constitutional standards unless there 
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged action,”235 limits the obligation on contractors to abide by 
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international law, although different cases have used more or 
less expansive interpretations of that doctrine. Court rulings 
have held that “private persons” and corporations may be held 
liable by U.S. or foreign citizens for war crimes according to the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS),236 but the Supreme Court narrowed 
the scope of the ATS in 2004.237 District courts have dismissed 
torture claims against private contractors on the basis that the 
ATS applies to “official” torture—while noting that if the tor-
ture had been official, the case would have still been dismissed 
on grounds of sovereign immunity.238 
In 2009, the U.S. and sixteen other states signed the 
Montreux Document on private and military security compa-
nies, agreeing not to “outsource certain functions assigned by 
treaty to states parties,” to ensure that “contractors are aware 
of their obligations and trained accordingly,” to prevent and fa-
cilitate the punishment of contractors’ violations of interna-
tional law. The signatories also accepted state responsibility for 
reparations in the case of such violations.239 Thus, while inter-
national humanitarian law and international human rights law 
“do provide mechanisms for potentially reigning in some of the 
worst abuses,”240 these mechanisms have proven vague and in-
effectual to date. 
This legal ambiguity also has negative implications for con-
tractors themselves. International law discourages “mercenar-
ies” from involvement in conflict, though it defines this term so 
narrowly that it does not apply to many PMCs.241 Moreover, in-
ternational law does not clearly extend to PMCs the protections 
afforded to other participants in armed conflicts.242 Internation-
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al law distinguishes between civilians and combatants, with 
combatants defined as “members of the armed forces of a party 
to the conflict,”243 eligible to “participate directly in hostilities,” 
and lawful military targets,244 and civilians defined as ineligible 
to take part in hostilities but protected from direct attack.245 
Whether PMCs are civilians or combatants is situational and 
open to interpretation.246 This is important because, while com-
batants that obey the laws of war are entitled to prisoner-of-
war status and the protections of the Third Geneva Convention 
if captured,247 civilians who take part in hostilities may face 
criminal prosecution by the opposing side for violations of do-
mestic law even if they do not violate international law.248 In 
this sense, PMCs, like terrorists, may be considered “unlawful 
combatants” if they engage in combat (although this term is not 
used in international humanitarian law treaties).249 
C. REMEDIES TO PROMOTE CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
There are various suggestions as to how to remedy this 
lack of accountability. The first remedy addressed in this sec-
tion is legal reform; there is discussion of proposed legislation 
pertaining to PMCs considered by Congress. It then turns to 
strengthening the current enforcement regime and looks at 
suggestions on how to reform contracts between the govern-
ment and PMCs. Finally, reducing government reliance on 
PMCs is discussed. 
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1. Reform the Legal Status of PMCs 
In the U.S., several efforts have been made to close the le-
gal loopholes affecting PMCs, including amending the UCMJ 
and MEJA. The aforementioned CEJA has also been introduced 
to complement MEJA, with the “strong support” of the DOJ.250 
This bill aims to clarify and expand federal criminal jurisdic-
tion over federal contractors and employees outside the United 
States, “supplement rather than replace” existing “provisions of 
federal extraterritorial jurisdiction,” and deal with crimes in-
cluding “federal violent, corruption, and trafficking offenses.”251 
Amending international law to reflect the increasing preva-
lence of PMCs, (e.g. by expanding or simplifying the definition 
of “mercenary”) might be another way to increase accountabil-
ity.252 However, “if there is to be law reform in this area, it is 
important to bear in mind the difficulties with the existing con-
ventional law,” including lax enforcement and the emphasis in 
international law on the narrowly defined term “mercenary.”253 
At the same time, most of the bills intended to deal with 
PMC abuse and fraud failed to make any headway in Con-
gress.254 The aforementioned MEJA bill was passed by the 
House in 2007, but not by the Senate, and made no subsequent 
progress.255 Some provisions from the Comprehensive Contin-
gency Contracting Reform Act of 2012, backed by Sen. Claire 
McCaskill and building on the recommendations of the CWC, 
were incorporated into the 2013 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, but were “watered down over time or cut entirely.”256 
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While the role of money in politics is difficult to prove, this leg-
islative inertia likely results in part from the influence of mili-
tary contractors in Washington. Recent consolidation in the de-
fense contracting industry,257 the government’s reliance on 
military contractors, and the millions of dollars the industry 
spends on lobbying all combine to give military contractors 
substantial leverage to resist reforms.258 
2. Strengthen the Existing Enforcement Regime 
While many experts on PMCs are troubled by their legal 
unaccountability, Laura Dickinson, who focuses her studies on 
human rights and international security, argues that the legal 
jurisdiction for holding contractors accountable is adequate, 
and the real problem is the lack of an effective “enforcement re-
gime” for these laws. She thus makes three broad recommenda-
tions for organizational reforms. First, she suggests reforming 
government contracts with PMCs to include “public law values” 
(including human rights norms, norms against corruption and 
waste, and democratic processes)259 as well stronger oversight 
and enforcement requirements, and the requirement that con-
tractors receive accreditation.260 Second, she calls for greater 
public participation in the design and implementation of such 
contracts.261 And third, she suggests “reforming the organiza-
tional structure and culture of private security firms,” which 
might include a greater supervisory role for judge advocates 
and military commanders, as well as the adoption of legal corps 
and stricter standards within private security contractors.262 
While Singer is more skeptical of existing legal accounta-
bility, he also makes suggestions for reforming the relationship 
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between government and PMCs. Acknowledging that PMCs 
have proposed various self-regulation schemes, he argues that 
the public interest in the nature of their activities necessitates 
greater public scrutiny and regulation. Much of his suggested 
reforms focus on transparency, including “full disclosure of eq-
uity partners and client lists,” “more transparent licensing pro-
cesses, government oversight over local PMF contracts, and the 
establishment of financial and operational reporting require-
ments.”263 On the international level, he calls for a U.N. task 
force and ultimately a permanent international office to moni-
tor and regulate the industry.264 At the same time, like Dickin-
son, he sees the need for greater enforcement of existing ac-
countability measures, “a dedicated focus on managing the 
relationship to protect the public interest,” greater attention to 
the contract-making process, the establishment of “prior ac-
ceptable and sound business practices for the contract,” as well 
as effective supervision, administration, and enforcement of 
contracts with strict and immediate punishments for abuse.265 
For its part, the CWC also puts forward a broad array of 
recommendations, including more careful risk assessment prior 
to using PMCs, improved resources, authority, and procedures 
for acquisition and contractor oversight, increased coordination 
among and guidance for government agencies relating to con-
tractors, and more competitive bidding. To this end, the CWC 
has also called on Congress to legislate and provide funding for 
contracting reform.266 
Scholars on governance and military affairs praise Dickin-
son’s proposed reforms as practical and realistic.267 NGOs work-
ing on government accountability lauded the CWC for reaching 
bipartisan consensus on a “broader and compelling argument 
for systemic contracting reforms,” and the Commission has had 
some impact on government contracting practices.268 For exam-
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ple, according to the Government Accountability Office, the De-
fense Department took or planned to take “actions that directly 
align with about half of the CWC recommendations” by August 
2012, and State and USAID a third of the recommendations.269 
Even prior to the Commission’s final report, then-Senator 
Obama acknowledged that there were accountability issues in 
government contracting, broadly speaking, and pledged to sup-
port legislative reform.270 
3. Reduce Government Reliance on PMCs 
It may be wise to simply oppose privatization of security in 
general. Outsourcing of “essential or inherent functions” such 
as the armed forces and police both undermines the “capacity, 
effectiveness, and morale” of government and violates constitu-
tional and democratic principles.271 Another approach entails 
recognizing that PMCs do have some merits, but their use 
should be curtailed. This is the approach taken by the CWC, 
which argued the U.S. was “over-reliant” on contractors and 
should consider reducing their use or the “the number, nature, 
and scope of the overseas contingency operations” for which 
they are needed.272 
One way to reduce reliance on contractors would be to do so 
in particular areas rather than simply call for an overall reduc-
tion. For example, Singer argues that due to the lack of full 
command authority of military officers over PMCs, “wherever 
possible private security contracting should be kept out of criti-
cal battlefield areas,” and that “when the military requires a 
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service, it should be sure to examine first the possibilities of-
fered within the force, across other service branches, and then 
to trusted allied forces.”273 Likewise, the CWC recommended 
that the government “phase out use of private security contrac-
tors for certain functions,” particularly for guarding convoys or 
bases that are at risk of attack from enemy forces.274 
  CONCLUSION   
The preceding three case studies suggest that the public-
private distinction, a major normative and legal meta-
conception that has framed much of public discourse and policy 
making over the last two-hundred years, is obsolete. Many of 
the statements most commonly made in public discourse about 
the government and the market, or the state and individual 
rights, view one of these two realms as virtuous and the other 
as problematic. Many Americans see the government as coer-
cive and the private sector as the realm of freedom, and hence 
hold that the government should be checked and curbed and 
the private sector be free to follow its own course. Libertarians 
and civil libertarians similarly hold that the government is op-
pressive and that individual rights must be protected. In con-
trast, the left sees the private sector—particularly Wall 
Street—as the source of major societal deformations and seeks 
to use the government to check the private elites and promote 
social justice. However, the preceding case studies show that in 
at least these three major areas, the two sectors increasingly 
act as one, with the private sector carrying out government 
missions, and the government using the private sector to cir-
cumvent the limits imposed on it. A more accurate conception 
would treat American society (polity and economy included) as 
one whole, influenced by a set of factors that affect both the 
private and the public sectors. 
To provide but one more illustration of the extent to which 
the old but still-dominant framework is obsolete, take the fol-
lowing situation. In January 2009, the U.S. had about 34,400 
troops in Afghanistan.275 The U.S. military asked the White 
House to authorize a major increase in the level of troops com-
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mitted to this country (known as the Afghan surge). The re-
quest was followed by an intensive, months-long debate in the 
White House, Congress and the public over how many addi-
tional troops to commit. Some called for as many as 80,000, 
some for as few as zero.276 The President settled for 30,000, and 
eventually the troop level peaked at 100,000 in August 2010.277 
During the debate, however, almost no one mentioned that at 
the same time, the U.S. had deployed 74,000 PMCs in Afghani-
stan, many more than the additional troops.278 In reality, a 
larger “contractor surge” occurred over the same period: the 
number of contractors increased to 107,300 in December 2009. 
Moreover, as the U.S. drew down troop levels in Afghanistan 
beginning in 2011, it also undertook a second contractor surge 
with little fanfare: the number of contractors, which had fallen 
to 70,600 in September 2010, rose to 107,800 by March 2013.279 
This blind spot extends to casualty figures as well. When Pres-
ident Obama spoke in 2015 about the “more than 2,200 Ameri-
can patriots who made the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan,” 
for example, this did not include the 1,592 private contractors, 
thirty-two percent of whom were Americans, who were killed 
over the same period.280 A reasonable debate should have en-
compassed the size of both public and private forces. 
Any new approach need not hold that there are no differ-
ences between the private and public sector and hence treat 
privacy merchants as if they were agents of the NSA, members 
of the private police as public cops, and private military con-
tractors as troops. One promising approach focuses on what 
might be called the “degrees of separation.” This approach sug-
gests that private actors that are directly controlled by the gov-
ernment, have largely public missions, and are financed by the 
public (such as security guards hired to protect American dip-
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lomats) should be treated much more like public sector agents. 
In contrast, those who are private actors that mainly serve the 
private sector, market their wares to one and all (the govern-
ment included) and for whom the government is not a particu-
larly large or influential client, should be granted much more 
leeway. Those in between these two extremes should be treated 
accordingly. 
To avoid a misunderstanding: this Article suggests that all 
private agents who carry out a government function—directly 
or indirectly—should be subject to more accountability and 
oversight, of a kind similar to that which public agents are sub-
jected. However, there should be a difference in degree accord-
ing to the extent that the private actors are autonomous from 
the government. 
One analogue for the needed approach is the normative 
and legal response to the rise of the “on-demand” or “gig” econ-
omy, in which companies such as Uber use part-time contracts 
for jobs previously performed by employees. Recent court and 
administrative rulings have looked at the extent to which the 
rules that apply to the traditional employee-employer relation-
ship should also apply to the relationship between on-demand 
services and their contractors, based on several different crite-
ria. For example, in June 2015, the California Labor Commis-
sioner’s Office ruled that an Uber driver should be classified as 
an employee rather than an independent contractor, because 
Uber was “involved in every aspect of the operation” and played 
a controlling rather than merely facilitating role.281 Likewise, in 
August 2015, the National Labor Relations Board ruled that 
companies such as McDonalds that used contractors and fran-
chisees as intermediaries with their workers are still “joint em-
ployers” of those workers, which entitles unions representing 
these workers to bargain directly with the company as well as 
the contractor or franchisee.282 
More broadly, the distinction between workers and con-
tractors “has been the subject of intense legal battles for dec-
ades,” resulting in federal agencies designating the criteria that 
should be taken into account, with the extent of control usually 
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the most important.283 Thus, the IRS lists three broad catego-
ries: “behavioral,” in the sense of whether the company controls 
the worker’s performance; “financial,” in terms of whether the 
“business aspects of the worker’s job” are controlled by the 
company; and “type of relationship,” such as whether there is a 
written contract or long-term association and whether the work 
performed is a “key aspect of the business.”284 The difficulty of 
maintaining a sharp dichotomy between employees and con-
tractors suggests that it would be productive to employ a nu-
anced approach that involves gradations in employee status 
and employer obligations. The same is true for privacy mer-
chants, private police, private military contractors and all other 
private actors who carry out missions historically associated 
with the government. 
When one takes this approach in the context of developing 
a new meta-doctrine to replace the private/public sharp distinc-
tion, several variables standout as helpful in determining the 
degrees of separation between the government and its private 
agents. These include: 
(a) Command and control. Does the government directly 
order the private agents about, daily and in a tight formation, 
just like its own troops, or does the government define a mis-
sion and contract it out, but let private supervisors control the 
actual agents? 
(b) Accountability. Does misconduct by the private agents 
harm the public as much as would direct misconduct by the 
government (e.g. the way enhanced interrogations soiled Amer-
ican reputation in the Middle East and elsewhere), or is that 
harm largely absorbed by the private actor (e.g. cost overruns if 
charged to the company rather than the taxpayer)? 
(c) Financing. Does the government finance the private ac-
tor completely or to a significant degree, and hence gain consid-
erable influence over that actor? Or, is the government only one 
of the private actor’s many customers, limiting its influence? 
Surely other criteria might be developed, but these sug-
gested criteria illustrate the approach that would govern pri-
vate agents as if they were public ones, with varying levels of 
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strictness according to the extent they are separated from the 
public architecture. 
The rise of private contractors in American government 
creates a need for new society-wide normative and legal doc-
trines285 and a fundamental change in Western (and particular-
ly American) thinking. This change is illustrated by the notion 
that the Fourth Amendment may apply to private actors and 
not just to government agencies. It makes little sense to lock 
the door (of the public sector) if one leaves the windows (of the 
private sector) wide open. For American society to uphold the 
values it seeks to implement, it requires normative positions, 
policies, laws and institutions that apply to both sectors. Many 
of the remedies listed above are partial. Most are of merit, but 
nevertheless do not offer the kind of comprehensive new 
framework that the evidence suggests is needed. It will take an 
almost revolutionary effort to develop the needed comprehen-
sive meta-conception and integrate it into the policy and legal 
worlds.286 
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